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Abstract
In supply chain management, information about the downstream party’s will-
ingness to pay (wtp) for a service or a good sold by an upstream partymay not
be known to the latter. he seller has to make an educated guess for the price at
which to oòer a good or service. If the buyer refuses to buy, the seller can still
turn to a third party and sell at a lower price or hold onto the good. We show
that the seller has one interior proût maximizing price if his Bayesian belief
about the buyer’swtp follows a distributionwhich has an increasing failure rate
(IFR) in the sense of Barlow and Proschan (1965). We prove that the precision
of information available to the supplier inuences the rent distribution and
how the downstream partymight opportunisticallymis-inform the upstream
partner. We propose another reading of the single-price newsvendor problem
in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), Ziya et al. (2004a,b), Paul (2006) or Lariviere
(2006). Our approach applies to all types ofmechanism design problemswhere
a proût-maximizing party has to rely on Bayesian belief to palliate information
asymmetry and has alternative sources of income or cost.
Keywords: supply chain management, information asymmetry, Bayesian belief,mech-
anism design, increasing failure rate.
JEL classiûcation:
1 Introduction
Motivation for the present paper can be found in the way that some suppliers have to
price some specialized good or servicewhich they sell to somemanufacturer. Usually,
the supplier can already sell the same good in diòerent markets for diòerent uses
and at diòerent prices. For example, several dozens of chemical or mineral products
have wide ranging applications: calcium carbonate is used in industries like paint,
plastic, rubber, ceramic, cement, glass, steel, oil reûning, iron ore puriûcation and
biorock creation for mariculture of sea organisms. Chemical colouring pigments
can variously be used for paint, cosmetic or ink markets. In the garment and apparel
industry, a fashion good can be sold during season in onemarket but can still be
salvaged in another market. In most of the above instances, the exact relationship
between demand in alternativemarkets and pricemay not be known. In fact, the
supplier may have to guess at his potential clients’ wtp building upon his prior
knowledge of the industry, the existing competition, alternative sources of supply,
etc. his lack of information may induce unsatisfactory pricing decisions and either
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unsuccessful oòers or less proûtable transaction. On the other hand, the buyer will
usually hide or mis-inform the seller about his wtp. How is the supplier to price his
good and what is the eòect on the supply chain eõciency?
We try to answer this question using amechanism design approach in a games
theoretic setting where a principal wishes to oòer a price for some product or service
to an agent. If the agent rejects the oòer, the principal is le with the revenue
generated from selling to a third party. he seller is in a Bayesian setting of incomplete
information and must form a belief about the agent’s wtp. his belief follows a
distribution over a range of possible values.
hemodel shows how the seller maximizes his proût by his pricing decision and
how the buyer will attempt to increase his rent in detriment of the buyer by keeping
information private. hemodel implies that joint forecasting and collaboration by
the downstream partner will increase the risk of opportunistic behaviour on the
upstream partner’s part.
he present model helps to present in a new light the newsvendor one from
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) in which the single price contract is studied when buyer
and seller know of the distribution of demand and the sensibility to price of this
demand. Instead of using the characteristics of the increasing generalized failure
rate (IGFR) as in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), we demonstrate that the distributions
which admit an increasing failure rate will enable the principal to enjoy a concave
proût function which admits one optimal solution.
he paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief review
of existing literature justifying our approach. hemodel is presented in §3. In §4, we
present the results which can be applied when the upstream agent has to deal with
several downstream customers and thus faces several belief distributions or when he
can potentially rescale his belief. An application and corresponding insights when
comparing an integrated to a decentralized supply chain management is presented
in §5, further illustrated succinctly in §6 before concluding in §7.
2 Literature
To the best of our knowledge, no model addresses and solves such a setting. his
problem was numerically solved in Brusset (2009, 2010) as particular instances of
the much broader mechanism design problem presented here. A similar model
is presented in Lariviere (2006), the example cited is of a service’s pricing. One
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customer arrives per period, and service takes one period. he cost of service is zero.
Customers privately observe their valuations, which are independent and identically
distributed according to F(X), a cumulative continuous distribution function. A
ûrm posting price x then faces demand D(x) = F(x), where F(x) = 1 − F(x), and
sets x to maximize revenue, Π(x) = xD(x). An optimal price x∗ must solve
Π′(x∗) = D(x∗) + x∗D′(x∗) = F(x∗)(1 − д(x∗)) = 0, (1)
when Π′′(x∗) < 0, and where д(x) = x f (x)F(x) , the generalized failure rate as deûned
in Lariviere and Porteus (2001).
he uniqueness of x∗ depends on the generalized failure rate д(X). In particular,
as stated in Lariviere (2006), if д(X) is increasing, it can equal one at only a single
point, and the unique x∗ must solve д(x∗) = 1.
In diòerence to themodel we consider here, the seller is informed of the buyer’s
wtp.
he generalized failure rate function has become popular in the last few years in
supply chain management literature, having been cited no less than 55 times as of
this writing (source: Google Scholar). he applications havemostly been in models
where demand can be modeled as following such a distribution. As much as we
would like to use and extend the use of such functions in supply chain management,
these distributions have some irksome limitations. As noted in Paul (2005), the
IGFR distributions are not closed under convolutions or shiing which limits their
use in supply chain models where demand among several retailers may have to
be aggregated. So even though the IGFR property is remarkably inclusive, we feel
that the robustness and extensibility of the results warrant a preference for the IFR
property. We concur with Paul (2005) in arguing that this property is of greater use
and should demonstratemore practical value in future research than the IGFR one
used in Lariviere (2006).
hemodels presented in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) or inZiya et al. (2004a) also
involve amanufacturer selling to a newsvendor given assumptions about demand.
he model in Ziya et al. (2004b) studies the optimal admission price to a service
facility for customers who have a known willingness to pay distribution function.
hemodel in Paul (2006) reûnes the newsvendor models of Lariviere and Por-
teus (2001) and Lariviere (2006) by oòering some restrictive conditions so that the
manufacturer is guaranteed to have a unimodal proût function.
Yet in all of the above models, salvage costs, facility capacity cost or overage
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costs are not included in the objective functions. So none of thesemodels capture
the standard supply chain management model where the seller may, additionally to
selling to his standard customer, salvage, hold or turn to another customer.
We extend the use of the IFR property ûrst presented in Barlow and Proschan
(1965) to the area of Bayesian statistical inference in decision theory. In our model,
a decision maker uses a estimate based upon a prior descriptive probabilitymodel
about an unknown piece of information to maximize his utility. his model has
applicationswithin both contract and games theory andhaswide ranging applications
in the classical case of a buyer-seller relationship within supply chain management
where the seller has outside opportunities and is uninformed about the buyer’s wtp.
he distributionswhich have increasing failure rate, also deûned a the probability
of failure within a ûnite interval of time, were ûrst studied extensively in Barlow and
Proschan (1965), to model the reliability of systems and have variously been named
hazard rate or failure rate depending upon the area of research. From Barlow and
Proschan (1965), we know that the distributions which enjoy increasing failure rates
include the uniform continuous, gamma,Weibull,modiûed extreme value and the
truncated normal distributions when their parameters are the commonly accepted
ones. hese distributions are of interest in operations and supply chain management
research because of the implications in the evaluation of some types of objective
functions which model stochastic events or Bayesian beliefs. Due to the extensive
research in convolution, comparisons, inequalities, bounds and dominance of IFR
distributions (Barlow, 2003), arguably further results should be obtainable in supply
chain management and game theoretic research. Tests have been devised to help
determine from a sample of observations whether the underlying population does
have an increasing failure rate.
3 Model
he seller, as principal and Stackelberg leader, is uninformed of the agent’s wtp for a
good he wishes to sell. If he guesses wrongly this level, the seller can still dump his
good on a third party for a price α. he seller has to form a Bayesian belief about the
distribution of this wtp.
Let X represent the agent’s wtp as a random variable with distribution F ranging
over [X , X], continuous and twice diòerentiable. Let f be its probability density. We
assume that 0 < X < X. his distribution’s failure rate function as deûned in Barlow
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and Proschan (1965) is r(X) = f (X)/F(X). X has an increasing failure rate (IFR)
or, equivalently, F is an IFR distribution if r(X) is weakly increasing for all X such
that F(X) < 1. We deûne α, a real, as the price received by the principal when the
agent refuses the oòer.
0 < X ≤ α ≤ X . (2)
Note that if that were not the case, the seller’s belief would have no bearing on his
objective function. If α < X, themaximum revenue for the principal is achieved for
him by choosing X as the oòering price. Similarly, if α > X, the principal chooses X.
Tracing a parallel to themodel in Lariviere (2006), here the seller also has to sell
to a downstream partner (say a retailer) any quantity at a posted price. However, in
our setting, the supplier can also sell to a third party in the case where the quoted
price does not satisfy the buyer. his option can also be seen as the buyer’s option of
returning all unsold goods to the supplier. In Lariviere (2006), the seller bears no
responsibility for the unsold goods and enjoys full information about the retailer’s
demand and retail price.
Here, the seller does not have information about the buyer’s wtp nor about the
competition’s eventual oòer, so the seller must maximize the following objective
function
Π(x) = αF(x) + xF(x),= F(x)(α − x) + x , (3)
aer normalizing the cost to 0. he case where α = 0 is the one covered in Lariviere
(2006). We propose to prove that a unique interior point within the range [X , X]
does indeedmaximize it. We ûst show that the point exists, is amaximum and then
prove that it is unique.
3.1 Does the optimal interior point exist?
We now prove that such an optimum exists.
For that, we proceed to prove that⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Π′(X) ≥ 0,
Π′(X) ≤ 0. (4)
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By construction of F(.), even though f (x) > 0 and F(x) < 1, at the limit,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
limx→X Π′(x) = f (X)(α − X) + 1
limx→X Π′(x) = f (X)(α − X). (5)
For both conditions in (6) to be true, we obtain the following conditions⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
X < α + 1f (X)
X > α. (6)
3.2 Is the optimum amaximum?
A property of the increasing failure rate which is of interest in what follows is that
r′(x) ≥ 0. (7)
his means that
f ′(x)(1 − F(x)) + f (x)2 ≥ 0. (8)
he ûrst order condition (F.O.C.) requires that
Π′(x) = f (x)(α − x) + F(x) = 0. (9)
We describe in the following corollaries the properties of this ûrst diòerential
Corollary 1 If F is such that F(1) = 1, then x = 1 is solution and is also a maximum
because Π′′(1) < 0. his covers the case when the properties of the IFR distributions
cannot be applied since at x = 1, r(x) is not deûned. Similarly, if f (X) = 0, then X is
amaximum if X ≤ α because Π′′(X) ≥ 0.
For all cases such that f (x) > 0, we can write the F.O.C. as
α − x = −F(x)
f (x) . (10)
he second order condition (S.O.C.) for amaximum requires that
Π′′(x) = (α − x) f ′(x) − 2 f (x) < 0. (11)
In the case when f (x) > 0, when we replace (α − x) from (10) in (11), we obtain
f (x)Π′′(x) = −r′(x) − f (x)2. (12)
Since f (.) is positive and r(.) is increasing, when the F.O.C. is satisûed, the S.O.C. is
also satisûed.
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Corollary 2 Since F is increasing, the domain [X , X] can be truncated at the largest
value x1 for which f (x1) = 0 and set X = x1. So when x = X, Π(x) = X.
By deûnition of the ûrst diòerential of the failure rate r′(x) ≥ 0. So, because
f (x) > 0, R′′(x) < 0.
So, if ∃x0 ∣Π′(x0) = 0 ⇒ Π′′(x0) < 0. (13)
If a value existswhich is an extremum for the objective function, it is amaximum.
Let us now see whether this maximum is unique.
3.3 Is this maximum unique?
Reasoning by the absurd, if
∃(x0, x1) ∈ [X , X]2, ∣ x0 < x1, Π′(x0) = Π′(x1) = 0, (14)
then by (13),
Π′′(x0) < 0 ∧Π′′(x1) < 0. (15)
Since Π(.) is continuous by construction, it decreases for values in the vicinity and
above x0, whereas it increases for values in the vicinity but below x1. Hence, between
x0 and x1, R′(.) changes sign, so that
∃x2 ∈]x0, x1[, ∣Π′(x2) = 0,Π′′(x2) ≥ 0, (16)
his contradicts (13). Hence there cannot exist another point x1, distinct from x0, for
which Π′(x1) = 0.
We conclude that the point which represents the maximum of the objective
function in the interval [X , X], if it exists, is unique.
All of the above allow us to enunciate the following theorem.
heorem 3 Assuming that F is IFRwith a ûnite support [a, b], then the principal has
a unique optimal solution x∗ to his concave proût function which is solution to
x∗ − α = F(x∗)
f (x∗) . (17)
Corollary 4 he optimal value is always higher than the outside option price α re-
ecting the fact that there is a non-zero probability that the buyer is willing to pay
more than α.
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4 Properties of IFR distributions
In this section, we present some useful properties of the IFR distributions. We show
some properties of the addition of distributions andmultiplication by a scalar. hese
properties can be applied in cases where the upstream party has to price a good
or service to several potential customers involved in diòerent industries and hence
where the beliefs about their outside options may be diòerent. hemultiplication by
a scalar can allow a principal involved in amulti period game to update his belief.
heorem 5 Let F and G two IFR distributions with density resp. f and д then
1. F +G is an IFR distribution.
2. FG is an IFR distribution if дF − fGG ≥ 0 and fG − дFF ≥ 0.
Before beginning the proof, note that if F = G then the above condition in 2.
becomes 1 − F ≥ 0 which is always satisûed.
Proof. Proof ofheorem 5
Let’s introduce the failure rates functions rF(x) = f (x)F(x) , rG(x) = д(x)G(x) , rF+G(x) =( f+д)(x)(F+G)(x) and rFG(x) = ( fG+Fд)(x)(FG)(x) .
1. We notice that
rF+G(x) = F(x)F +G(x) rF(x) + G(x)F +G(x) rG(x). (18)
hen it can be established that
r′F+G(x) = [ F(x)F +G(x)]′rF(x) + F(x)F +G(x) r′F(x)
+[ G(x)
F +G(x)]′rG(x) + G(x)F +G(x) r′G(x) (19)
where rF , r′F , rG , r′G , FF+G and GF+G are positive functions. So we just have to demon-
strate that [ F(x)
F +G(x)]′ ≥ 0 (20)
and [ G(x)
F +G(x)]′ ≥ 0 (21)
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to ûnish the proof.
[ F
F +G ]′ = F
′(F +G) − F(F +G)′(F +G)2
= f (F +G) + F( f + д)(F +G)2 (22)
= fG + Fд(F +G)2≥ 0.
By symmetry we can obtain also
[ G
F +G ]′ ≥ 0 (23)
such that rF+G(x) is weakly increasing for all x verifying (F +G)(x) < 1.
We now proceed to prove that if F and G are IFR, then FG, the product of F and
G, is IFR.We notice that
rFG(x) = G(x)F(x)FG(x) rF(x) + F(x)G(x)FG(x) rG(x). (24)
hen it can be established that
r′FG(x) = [G(x)F(x)FG(x) ]′rF(x) + G(x)F(x)FG(x) r′F(x)
+ [F(x)G(x)
FG(x) ]′rG(x) + F(x)G(x)FG(x) r′G(x) (25)
where rF , r′F , rG , r′G , GFFG and FGFG are positive functions. Further, we have
[GF
FG
]′ = (дF −G f )FG −GF(FG)′(FG)2
= дF −G f + f FG2 + f FG2(FG)2 (26)
= дF − fGG(FG)2 . (27)
For r′FG ≥ 0, we simply need to demonstrate that :
(дF − fGG)rF +GF FGr′F ≥ 0, (28)
because of the symmetry between G and F.
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Using f ′F ≥ − f 2 from r′F ≥ 0, we can write
(дF − fGG)rF +GF FGr′F = 1F [ f (дF − fGG) +GFG( f ′F + f 2)]= 1
F
[ f дF + f ′FGFG + f 2G(FG −G)]
= 1
F
[ f дF + f ′FGFG + f 2G2(F]
≥ 1
F
[ f дF + f 2G(GF − FG)] (29)
= 1
F
[ f дF − f 2GG] (30)
= f
F
[дF − fGG] (31)
(32)
which is positive if дF − fGG ≥ 0.
5 Supply chain performance
Let us compare the performance of this decentralized asymmetric informationmodel
with the case when the same supplier andmanufacturer work in the same organi-
zation as an integrated supply chain with a single-price contract. Let Πi represent
the integrated channel proût, Πi = Πs +Πm with the subscript letters s and m rep-
resenting the proûts to the supplier andmanufacturer. We deûne for this scenario
the manufacturer’s selling price of the good or service bought from the supplier
as r, r > 0 and an alternative sourcing price for the same good or service from a
non-strategic third party γ. Each party has the opportunity to source or sell outside
the organization if that opportunity yields a larger overall proût. In this case, the
supplier knows themanufacturer’s wtp and adjusts x∗ = γ so that the parties have
the following proûts according to the respective cost of γ and α to themanufacturer.
α ≥ γ ⇒
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Πm(x) = r − γ,
Πs(x) = α,
Πi = r − γ + α,
α ≤ γ ⇒
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Πm = r − γ,
Πs = γ,
Πi = r.
(33)
he casewhere α ≥ γ is a trivial one : if themanufacturer is able to ûnd an alternative
source for the product or service by the supplier which is lower than the alternative
selling opportunity that the supplier faces, both turn to their alternatives and the
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supply chain’s integrated proût is enhanced but not based on the integration of that
supply chain. In what follows, we focus on α ≥ γ.
he interest is to compare the outcome of the integrated supply chain’s proût to
the one achieved by the decentralized one. If themanufacturer accepts the supplier’s
oòer, it is because γ > x∗, in which case, the decentralized proût is similar to the
integrated case. If γ < x∗, we have as decentralized proût⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
γ < x∗, ⇒ Πd = r − γ + α.
γ ≥ x∗ ⇒ Πd = r. (34)
Hence, we can evaluate the diòerence between the proût for the supplier in the
integrated and decentralized supply chains as
Πsi −Πsd = γ − αF(x∗) − x∗F(x∗). (35)
his diòerence tends to 0 as the ûrst moment of F(.) tends to γ and as the second
moment tends to 0. In other words, if we consider that the precision of information
available is continuous, then as the seller becomes better informed, the diòerence
between the integrated and decentralized chains becomes smaller. Given opportu-
nity for mutually beneûcial interaction, supply chain eõciency increases with the
availability and precision of information about a buyer’s wtp.
here is another conclusion which can be made from the diòerence between
integrated and decentralized supply chain rents presented in equation (35). In the
decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer’s rent increases with the standard
deviation of the supplier’s belief distribution. In other words, themanufacturer will
tend to refrain from informing or signaling to the supplier about his true alternative
options in the hope that the optimal x∗ will be low compared to his outside option.
he supply chain’s overall rent may be unchanged but the conditions for trust and
goodwill among its members are not favourable. In fact, our result point to active
mis-information by the buyer of his wtp to the seller.
In table 1, we present the values that the parameters of some of the classical
IFR distributions so that themean converges towards γ and the standard deviation
towards 0.
Let us examine how the supplier’s optimal x∗ based upon a belief which follows
a Normal IFR distribution would behave. Suppose that γ = 8 and α = 1. In ûgure 1
we can see that the optimal quantity decreases before increasing again as σ decreases.
he fact that x∗ is “high” for high values of σ can be put down to the fact that
Estimating the buyer’s willingness to pay using Bayesian belief 13
Table 1: Table of the values to be given to the parameters of the IFR distributions if
the belief has to converge towards the true value of γ
Distribution 1st parameter 2nd parameter
Uniform(a, b) a = b = γ –
Normal(µ, σ) µ = γ σ = 0
Weibull(α, β) β = γ α →∞
Gamma(α, θ) α = γ/θ θ → 0+
Log Normal(µ, σ) µ = Loд(γ) σ → 0+
Extreme Value(α, β) α = γ β = 0
the belief distribution spans an areamuch larger and includes a larger probability
of values for which the alternative α = 1 is more interesting. In other words, the
alternative becomes a bulwark which helps the supplier in case themanufacturer has
an alternative which is higher than α. he other conclusion is that x∗ converges to
γ as σ tends to 0. he standard deviation of the belief distribution is a proxy to the
precision of the supplier’s information.
6 Numerical illustration
Let us illustrate the result with with two diòerent distributions. he ûrst is a uni-
form continuous distribution on the range [1, 8]. he second is an extreme value
distribution with parameters with location parameter α = 1 and scale parameter
β = 8. In both cases, the outside option α = 4. he graphs in ûgure 2 represent the
corresponding proût functions and optimal values x∗.
From heorem 3, we obtain x∗ = 6 for the uniform distribution and x∗ = 12.9671
for the extreme value distribution, both of which are higher than the outside option
price α = 4 and eòectively represent themaximum of the proût function.
7 Conclusion
We prove that for all IFR distributions, and when the range of possible values of the
random variable includes the outside option price α, the objective function of the
formΠ(x) = αF(x)+xF(x) admits one single interiormaximizing point. his result
has applications in operational research and supply chain management which use
game theoretic settings where a Stackelberg leader makes a take-it-or-leave-it oòer to
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Figure 1: Representation of the optimal solution for the supplier as his information
about the true value of the alternative option to themanufacturer becomes more
precise. γ = 8 and the alternative α = 1 in this example where the belief follows a
Normal(8, σ).
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Figure 2: Representation of the proût function and optimal solution when the belief
distribution is uniform and ranges between 1 and 8 (le graph), when the belief
distribution follows an extreme value distribution (right graph) and α = 4.
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sell a product or service to the agent relying only upon a Bayesian prior belief of the
agent’s wtp. We prove here that the supply chain rent may be distributed diòerently
according to the standard deviation of the upstream partner’s belief and give the
correspondence between this belief and the supplier’s rent. As the information about
the downstream’s outside option becomes more precise, the upstream partner is able
to increase his share of the supply chain rent in detriment of the downstream partner.
We suggest that the conditions for deliberate disinformation by the upstream partner
as to his outside options are thus given.
hese results can be applied to repeated games in which case the new range
distribution depends upon Bayesian updating with cutoò (Hart and Tirole, 1988).
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